Introduction
The general view in the economic literature is that bank competition promotes economic growth (e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2005) . In China, however, the banking industry dominates the financial system (Allen et al., 2012) . Just five state-owned banks held 47% of total banking sector assets at the end of 2011 (CBRC Annual Report, 2012) .
1
As competition often relates to banking system efficiency, the dominance of the five largest state-owned banks also raises the corollary issue of efficiency of the Chinese banking industry. Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009) Our first aim is to measure the level and the evolution of banking competition in China over the past decade. This is of particular interest for the analysis of the banking industry. First, it provides information on the degree of competition for Chinese banks relative to other countries. Second, it assembles evidence on the evolution of bank competition in China during a decade marked by profound reforms of the Chinese banking industry, especially concerning the large state-owned banks. These reforms include a transfer of non-performing loans to asset management companies, bank recapitalization, and the entry of minority foreign strategic investors in several banks. China's accession to the WTO in 2001 allowed foreign banks access to the banking system, albeit market share held by foreigners remains very low. Our analysis helps assess the market power of banks over the decade. We check whether large state-owned banks differ in market power relative to other banks. This provides information about the effects on competition from the persistence of large state-owned banks and the entry of foreign banks.
Our second aim here is to investigate the efficiency of Chinese banks in recent years. Several studies analyze bank efficiency in China (e.g. Chen, Skully, and Brown, 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; Ariff and Can, 2008; and Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 2009) but they rely on datasets from the 1990s and early 2000s. We update the discussion of efficiency of Chinese banks by looking at the situation after reforms in the banking industry.
One topic of particular interest is whether large state-owned banks still suffer from lower efficiency than their counterparts.
The third aim is to investigate the relationship and causality between competition and efficiency in the Chinese banking industry as these characteristics of market structure are seen as related in other contexts. The intuitive "quiet life" hypothesis suggests that competition promotes higher efficiency. The theoretical "efficient-structure" hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973) , in contrast, predicts a negative impact of efficiency on competition, as more efficient banks would benefit from lower costs and thus gain higher market shares.
Furthermore, the specific characteristics of bank competition may negatively influence efficiency as reduced competition lets banks benefit from economies of scale in monitoring borrowers and through longer-term customer relationships.
The sign and direction of causality of the relationship between competition and efficiency in the Chinese banking industry have normative implications for bank regulators.
If we find evidence showing a positive impact of bank competition on efficiency, the policy conclusion would be that regulators should favor pro-competitive policies in the Chinese banking industry as it promotes economic gains through greater consumer welfare and efficiency of Chinese banks. On the other hand, a finding that efficiency negatively impacts bank competition in line with literature on other countries (e.g. Casu and Girardone, 2009 ) would imply that bank regulators face a trade-off and should moderate their application of pro-competitive policies. In addition, the observation of a detrimental impact of efficiency on competition that accords with the "efficient-structure hypothesis" would imply pro-competitive policies have little relevance. Fu and Heffernan (2009) analyze the interrelationships of profitability, cost efficiency, and market structure indicators (concentration indices and market share) for Chinese banks between 1985 and 2002. They find no relation between cost efficiency and market structure indicators. However, their study provides limited evidence relevant to our We analyze the relation and causality between competition and efficiency in the Chinese banking industry by computing Lerner indices to measure competition in line with recent studies on bank competition (e.g. Carbo et al., 2009; Turk-Ariss, 2010 efficiency, that results from a detrimental impact of competition on efficiency. These results contradict the intuitive notion that competition is positively related to efficiency. We thus ask if a similar conclusion is warranted for the Chinese banking industry.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the recent evolution of the Chinese banking industry and surveys the literature related to the relation between competition and efficiency, as well as banking in China. Section 3 discusses data and methodology. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. China's banking sector reforms were part of the broader economic reforms and were implemented gradually. Initially, a two-tier banking system was introduced so that the PBC retained its central bank functions as commercial operations were transferred to four specialized state-owned banks.
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During the second phase of reforms, which were launched in 1994, the Chinese government had to respond to growing asset quality deterioration of large state-owned banks. Three policy banks were established with the objective of separating policy lending from commercial lending. In 1995, the Commercial Bank Law of China officially granted the "Big Four" banks commercial bank status. In 1998, the first round of state-bank recapitalization to deal with the stock of non-performing loans (NPLs) took place. The following year, the first transfer of NPLs to asset management companies occurred. New banks also entered the market during this period. For example, Minsheng Banking Corporation (China's largest private bank) was created in 1996. In December 2001, China entered WTO and committed to opening up its banking system to foreign banks over the next five years.
These new state-owned banks started to perform the main financial intermediation functions in the mid-1980s after they were allowed to accept deposits and grant loans. At the same time, the establishment of several new banks was permitted.
The third phase of reforms involved getting the large state-owned commercial banks in shape for initial public offerings and listing. 
The relation between competition and efficiency in banking
Despite the dearth of theoretical literature on the link between competition and efficiency, the sentiment of Caves (1980, p. 88 ) that economists have "a vague suspicion that competition is the enemy of sloth" is widespread. We identify three strands of thought on the relationship of competition and efficiency in the literature.
The "quiet life" hypothesis that increased competition enhances cost efficiency derives from the idea that monopoly power allows managers to grab a share of the monopoly rents through discretionary expenses or a reduction of their efforts. Hicks (1935) suggests that monopoly power allows firms to relax their efforts. Nonetheless, the existence of a monopoly rent does not explain its appropriation by managers. Owners of monopolistic firms can exert the same control of managerial effort than those of competitive firms, and might thus prevent this appropriation. Leibenstein (1966) bolsters Hicks' argument by explaining why inefficiencies inside firms (X-inefficiencies) exist and why they are reduced by the degree of competition in product markets. He explains that X-inefficiencies come from imperfections in the in-ternal organization of firms creating information asymmetries between owners and managers. Competition reduces these inefficiencies in two ways. First, it provides incentives for managers to exert more effort to avoid the personal costs of bankruptcy. Second, a greater degree of competition provides owners with better knowledge to assess the performance of their firm (and managers) relative to other firms. Following Leibenstein's work, some papers have proposed a formalization of his ideas (e.g. Hart, 1983; Scharfstein, 1988) .
The "efficient-structure" hypothesis, proposed by Demsetz (1973) , predicts that cost efficiency reduces competition. It contradicts the "quiet life" view in terms of both sign and direction of causality. Here, the best-managed firms have the lowest costs and consequently the largest market shares. This leads to a higher level of concentration. As concentration can be considered an inverse measure of the competition, a negative link between competition and efficiency is expected.
Finally, we have the "banking specificities" hypothesis, which suggests that competition has a detrimental impact on cost efficiency. While the first two views are not specific to banking markets, the theoretical literature suggests that the banking industry is unique in how it operates. Developed by Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, and Schobert (2008) , the starting point of this hypothesis is the observation of the imperfect competition structure of banking markets, which is stressed in most studies analyzing bank competition (e.g. This hypothesis is complemented by Diamond (1984) , who shows that banks, un- Both works corroborate the results of earlier studies that show a negative relation between competition and efficiency. Moreover, as causality runs from competition to efficiency, they suggest that this relation is better explained by the "banking specificities" hypothesis than the "efficient-structure" hypothesis.
All in all, the theoretical literature provides conflicting arguments with respect to the sign and direction of causality between competition and efficiency. The empirical literature tends to support a negative relation.
Competition and efficiency in Chinese banking
Bank competition in China has received surprisingly little academic treatment. We are aware of only two publications that analyze this issue.
Yuan (2006) in monopolistic competition, monopoly, or perfect competition. It is unsuited to assessing the evolution of bank competition over time.
In contrast, bank efficiency in China has been tackled in several studies. Chen, Skully, and Brown (2005) for profit efficiency.
The conclusions of studies on bank efficiency in China are consistent in two respects. First, they agree that ownership affects efficiency; in particular, large state-owned banks tend to be less efficient. Second, there is no consensus in estimations of inefficiencies in the Chinese banking industry; various mean cost efficiency levels are reported. This could be the result of different observation periods, or the size and composition of samples.
In any case, our sample of Chinese banks is larger than any of these earlier studies, and hopefully provides a more comprehensive view on the efficiency of Chinese banks.
3 Data and methodology
Data
We Table 1 . where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w 1 the price of labor (ratio of personnel expenses to total assets), Once marginal cost is estimated and price of output computed, we can calculate the Lerner index for each bank and obtain a direct measure of bank competition.
Lerner indices

Efficiency scores
Cost efficiency measures how close a bank's cost is to its optimal cost when producing the same bundle of outputs. Several methods are used in the literature to measure efficiency with frontier approaches. They are all based on the estimation of a cost frontier, but they mainly differ in the assumptions made to disentangle the distance from the frontier between an inefficiency term and a random error. We adopt the stochastic frontier approach, which has been widely used in the literature to estimate cost efficiency scores (e.g. Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 2009; Fu and Heffernan, 2009 ).
The stochastic frontier approach disentangles inefficiency from random error by assuming a normal distribution for the random error and a one-sided distribution for the inefficiency term. The basic model assumes that total cost deviates from the optimal cost by a random disturbance, v, and an inefficiency term, u. Thus, the cost function is TC = f(Y, P) + ε where TC represents total cost, Y is the vector of outputs, P the vector of input prices, and ε the error term (the sum of u and v). u is a one-sided component representing cost inefficiencies, i.e. the degree of weakness of managerial performance. v is a two-sided component representing random disturbances, reflecting bad (good) luck or measurement errors. u and v are independently distributed. v is assumed to have a normal distribution.
We assume a gamma distribution for the inefficiency term u following Greene (1990) . Following Jondrow et al. (1982) , bank-specific estimates of inefficiency terms are calculated using the distribution of the inefficiency term conditional to the estimate of the composite error term ε. Greene (1990) provides the estimate of the cost inefficiency term with a gamma distribution.
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We estimate a system of equations composed of a translog cost function and its associated input cost share equations, derived using Shephard's lemma. where TC is total costs, y m m th bank output (m=1,2), w n n th input price (n=1,2), w 3 the price of borrowed funds, S n the input cost share 10 (n=1,2), and η n an error term (η n is independent from ε). For simplicity in presentation, the indices for each bank have been dropped. The model is estimated for all years so that we estimate one common cost frontier over the entire period. We include time dummy variables in the cost frontier.
The relation between competition and efficiency
A key issue of this paper is to study the relation between competition and efficiency of Chinese banks. We aim at investigating the sign of the relation but also the direction of causality between competition and efficiency.
Building on the work of Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, and Schobert (2009) 
Indice i represents the bank, while indice t denotes the year. Efficiency is the cost efficiency score. Lerner Index is the value of the Lerner Index, and ε i,t is the error term.
The first equation tests whether changes in efficiency temporally precede variations in market power, while the second equation evaluates whether changes in market power temporally precede variations in efficiency. We use two lags and estimate an AR (2) process for competition and efficiency variables. This number of lags is chosen according to the number of years available. Casu and Girardone (2009) also employ two lags in their study using yearly data.
Granger-causality is tested by a joint test in which the sum of the coefficients of the lagged explaining variable is tested to be significantly different from zero. The sum of these coefficients gives the overall measure of the effect of the explaining variable. The addition of the lagged dependent variables to the predicting variables creates econometric problems induced by unobserved bank-specific effects and joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables. To address these issues, we use GMM estimators for dynamic panel models developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . We use the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer's (2005) corrected standard error.
We include dummy variables for years.
Following Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, and Schobert (2009) and Casu and Girardone (2009), we do not include control variables in our estimations. We stress, however, that we have performed our estimations also by including a variable for bank size, defined by the logarithm of total assets. This inclusion does not affect our findings.
11 10 S n is equal to the expenses for the input n divided by total costs. 11 The results of these additional estimations are available on request.
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4 Results
This section presents the empirical results. We first display the estimates of Lerner indices and efficiency scores to provide insights on the evolution of competition and efficiency in the Chinese banking system. We then discuss the results concerning the relation between competition and efficiency for Chinese banks.
Lerner indices and efficiency scores
We first provide the estimates of competition and efficiency for Chinese banks over our period of study. These estimates indicate the level and evolution of both characteristics over time.
The development of the mean Lerner indices by years is displayed in Table 2 . We turn to the analysis of the efficiency scores for Chinese banks. The mean efficiency scores are presented in Table 3 . They are presented for all banks and for each type of bank. Several findings are fairly striking.
First, the average efficiency score over the period is 74.6%, with yearly mean efficiency scores between 67.2% and 78.2%. Thus, over the entire period banks were able on average to reduce their costs by a quarter for the given level of output. These cost efficien- 
The relation between competition and efficiency
We present the results on the relation between competition and efficiency for Chinese banks in Table 4 . The results suggest that the total impact of the Lerner index on cost efficiency is not significant, i.e. that changes in market power do not Granger-cause changes in cost efficiency. This finding is inconsistent with the "quiet life" hypothesis that market power has a negative impact on cost efficiency. It is also inconsistent with the "banking specificities" hypothesis, whereby the impact should be positive. This finding differs from that observed by Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, and Schobert (2008) and by Casu and Girardone (2009) for samples of European banks. It is also at odds with most literature on the link between market power and cost efficiency in the banking industry.
At the same time, we observe that the total impact of cost efficiency on the Lerner index is not significant. From a theoretical perspective, this does not accord with the "efficient-structure" hypothesis, which predicts a positive influence of cost efficiency on mar- and rendering the GMM estimator inconsistent. Moreover, the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments.
The "banking specificities" hypothesis may hold a possible explanation for our result, which suggests that, unlike in other countries, bank competition is not detrimental to efficiency in China. This hypothesis, which explains why competition hampers efficiency in banking as observed in studies of Western countries, is based on the existence of information asymmetries in the relationship between the bank and the borrower that give banks an incentive to implement mechanisms for solving the problems stemming from this relationship. They must perform a monitoring of borrowers for which economies of scale exist, and they have to establish long-term relationships to obtain information on borrowers.
Consequently, competition has a negative influence on cost efficiency of banks by increasing costs of the lending activity, owing to the need to pursue economies of scale in the face of shorter customer relationships.
This hypothesis may play a lesser role in China in comparison to the developed countries as it relates to the importance of information asymmetries in the relationship between bank and borrower. Unlike Western banks, Chinese banks are likely to suffer less from such information asymmetries. One reason is that the structure of loans of Chinese banks is biased toward loans to large state-owned companies (Herd, Hill, and Pigott, 2010) . For such big borrowers, information asymmetries are much lower than for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs are particularly rationed in terms of credit in China, while they belong to the companies for which opaqueness plays a key role in the lending relationship. We conduct robustness checks to confirm the validity of our empirical results on the relation between competition and efficiency.
First, we use an alternative technique to measure efficiency. We have adopted the stochastic frontier approach to estimate the cost efficiency frontier as it is standard in the literature. Nonetheless, a few researchers investigate the robustness of efficiency scores with different techniques (e.g. Bauer et al., 1998) . Their main conclusion is that the choice of the technique can influence the distribution of efficiency scores. Thus, we adopt an alternative technique to calculate efficiency scores: the time-varying WITHIN model proposed by Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990) . This technique has been rarely applied in works on bank efficiency (e.g. Esho, 2001; Weill, 2009) . Nevertheless, as this model relies on the panel data, it is of particular interest for our research. By using panel data, the WITHIN model does not require distributional assumptions on the inefficiency term and the random disturbance. The term ϕ it is modeled as follows:
where ϕ it = ϕ -u it , i indexes bank, t represents time, ϕ the intercept in the cost function, and the θs are cross-section bank-specific parameters.
We compute the coefficient of correlation between efficiency scores obtained by the stochastic frontier approach and those calculated using the WITHIN model: it is significantly positive and equals 0.51. This confirms that, even if the efficiency scores obtained by relying on these two techniques are not fully correlated, there is a high positive relation between them.
We report the results of estimations including efficiency scores computed with the WITHIN model in Table 5 . We again observe no relation between the Lerner index and cost efficiency in any direction. The total impact of the Lerner index on cost efficiency is not significant, as well as is the case for the total impact of cost efficiency on the Lerner index. Hence, these results corroborate those obtained with the efficiency scores based on the stochastic frontier approach.
We next employ the difference GMM estimator, which considers instruments as lags of the levels of the explanatory and dependent variables (Hansen, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991) . Two studies in the banking literature compare the results of the difference GMM estimator and the system GMM estimator (e.g. De Haas and Lelyveld, 2010) . In their analysis of the relation between competition and efficiency, Casu and Girardone (2010) report results for both estimators. We report the results of estimations with the difference GMM estimator in Table 6 . Our conclusion does not change: there is no significant impact of cost efficiency on market power, or of market power on cost efficiency.
Third, we compute four more robustness checks. 13 As our estimation results could be influenced by the choice of the lag length on the dependent and independent variable, we include a three-year lag on the dependent and independent variables. We further check the possibility of an instantaneous Granger causality by including the independent variable at time t in the regression.
14 Finally, to check whether the chosen GMM dynamic panel methodology influences our results, we perform simple regressions of efficiency scores on Lerner indices using bank and year fixed effects with and without controlling for bank size. The Lerner index is never significant, whereas bank size is statistically significant when included.
We also divide the sample in two sub-samples for the period before and after the financial crisis. One might argue that the relationship between competition and efficiency was temporarily disrupted by the financial crisis and the drastic in- All in all, our results and the robustness checks support the absence of any relation between market power and cost efficiency for Chinese banks.
13 These results, available upon request, are not reported here for the sake of brevity.
14 The test has the following form: Our investigation to identify a link between competition and efficiency showed no significant relation. Neither the effect of the Lerner index on cost efficiency, nor the effect of cost efficiency on the Lerner index is significant. This finding rejects the intuitive "quiet life" hypothesis that competition favors efficiency. It also differs from the earlier literature that found a negative relation between competition and efficiency. Thus, it appears that banking competition is not detrimental to efficiency in China.
From a normative perspective, our findings suggest that pro-competitive policies in the Chinese banking industry do not affect the cost efficiency of banks. On the one hand, this means that policies favoring cost efficiency of banks should be separately designed.
On the other hand, Chinese authorities might not suffer from the trade-off resulting from a negative impact of competition on efficiency. Indeed, the observation of such detrimental impact as found in other countries would have led to a trade-off between the benefits from lower banking prices and losses from lower efficiency due to tighter competition.
Our research is an initial step toward understanding of the effects of bank competition in China. Taking into account the implications for financial stability, further work is needed to investigate the influence of bank competition on financial stability in this country. 
